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CalGuns readers; kindly note the e-mail I sent to Congressman Stockman, co-sponsored by Representative Doug LaMalfa:
I was very pleased to see that you have the common sense to sponsor HR 3199 - Safe Military Bases Act. I respectfully offer a suggested amendment to:
- preclude the Commander in Chief - whomsoever he may be - from frustrating Congressional will in respect of this bill; and,
- to remove plausible excuses for voting against the bill.
I further - respectfully - argue that IF the sponsors of this fine bill FAIL to AMEND its language they will CONDEM it to FAILURE in the face of plausible practical and Constitutional arguments from Democrat and weak-kneed opponents.
My suggestion is to alter the bill to REQUIRE the commander of each base to arm AT LEAST: 10% of the qualified personnel at each base by FYE 2015; 20% by 2016; . . . 50% by 2020.
The first weakness in the existing language is found in "military personnel shall NOT be PROHIBITED". Neither Maj. Hasan nor Specialist Lopez would have objected to the current bill's permissive language. Obviously, stripping or undermining officers' ability to regulate arms-bearing is counterproductive for our intended subjects; it ENABLES the very individuals we hope to arrest! This permissive aspect of the bill alone probably dooms its prospects. However laudable the objective of killing Hasan or Lopez before he claimed his 2'nd victim, many will refuse to authorize perpetrators from carrying on base. Notwithstanding that such refusal is a false-economy, it gives cover to a Nay vote.
Merely-permissive language will be rendered ineffective by a sufficiently determined President or officer in charge of a particular service branch. Military discipline is implemented - in the main - by a social understanding that service members acquiesce to the wishes of their superior officers. If the President - or any officer - merely wishes that his subordinates remain un-armed, the obedient will comply. Unfortunately, the existing language represents nothing more than a prayer that a few honorable, conscientious and responsible service members will DEFY the wishes of their immediate and senior officers by bearing concealed weapons. I will grant you that 1 - 10% of such service members will bear arms at some risk of retaliation; however, this will not be ENOUGH to achieve the goals of the act.
The act's language ("shall not reinstate the firearm bans") will not frustrate a determined President or officer. To illustrate, the DoD or any officer could simply allow any service member to carry - ONLY - a full-sized US 1911 .45 caliber handgun. Likely, only a few service members would both defy the tacit wishes of their superiors and desire to carry a relatively heavy - bulky - weapon that does not lend itself to concealment.
To be effective, the act's plan must result in some combination of two possibilities:
- open-carrying by a majority of those present in every venue; or,
- concealed-carry by a probable substantial minority in every venue.
Under a "full-sized US 1911" permissive rule, Hasan nor Specialist Lopez would simply seek-out a venue where, apparently, no more than one service member is (conspicuously) armed.
Our goal should be to arm, for illustration:
- 10 - 20% of open-carriers willing to bear the additional weight on their belts; and,
- 20 - 30% of concealed-carriers willing to bear at least a pocket-pistol.
Facing a 99% probability that any group of service members includes several arms-bearers ought to accomplish the objectives of the act.
Finally my proposed language avoids singling-out individual service-members. A base-commander ought to ban a service member such as Hasan or Lopez from bearing arms on base. Yet, political correctness or sensitivity would inhibit a commander from singling-out named service members under language where all are presumptively permitted even if commanders retained discretion to name the excluded. Leaving the commanding officer in charge of exactly which 10 - 50% are ordered to bear arms eliminates this problem. Major Hasan would simply have never been chosen to be ordered to bear arms. Specialist Lopez would "randomly" be rotated-off the list of servicemen ordered to be armed; without such an order, he would (under the current regime) be prohibited from bearing arms. Assuming a rich mix of concealed carriers, no one would be stigmatized by completing a career without ever being "honored" with the order to bear arms. Typically, non-coms would deliver periodic orders to arm/dis-arm each individual and would then enforce discipline by watching for individuals not so-ordered who might be carrying unauthorized concealed weapons.
Second, there is a political facet in the language of the existing bill that would be cured by my proposed alternative. The nay-sayers will argue - with some justification - that there is at least one serviceman in every company who seems to have a screw-loose. He represents a low-probability/high-consequence risk. (The services' personnel needs for non-combatants renders prohibitive screening-out all recruits and active-duty risks.) Any such serviceman should not be armed outside the scope of actual combat. (Neither Hasan nor Lopez would likely ever need to be armed for combat given their respective jobs.) Opponents can easily assert such an argument to justify their votes in opposition to a permissive bill.
My proposed language preserves discretion of the military to keep this minority un-armed while their superiors remain unconvinced of their reliability. The commander of each base would be COMPELLED to arm ONLY those individuals he and his junior officers are convinced represent the lowest risk of unjustified violence. This is to say that my proposal is entirely consistent with the existing regime of commander discretion as to WHOM to arm while baring the executive from creating a de-facto "nobility" of a tiny "court" of MPs.
I can also see a Constitutional argument; a part of the "political" prospects for the proposed act. While the President is Commander in Chief, Congress has authority "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces". These two authorities are in contention. Arguably, the President's authority might trump that of Congress were the latter to strip the executive of ALL authority to regulate carrying firearms on military bases. We, the Constitutionalists, must not be seen as insensitive to separation-of-powers.
My proposed language overcomes the foregoing objections. My language only compels commissioned officers to arm a MINORITY of qualified ARMED-service members on base. Such a - very measured - "Rule" could not be seen as seen as exceeding Congressional authority. The executive branch would retrain discretion to regulate arms-bearing by at least 1/2 of those nominally qualified. Nay-sayers could not reasonably argue that more than 1/2 of nominally-qualified service members are unreliable.
I fear that if the sponsors of this act fail to anticipate, and overcome, the objections I've explained above they will condemn it to defeat. Indeed, many of the sponsors' constituents could suspect that defeat-in-a-noble-cause was the intention from the outset. Obviously, a simple majority of both houses is insufficient to overcome a Presidential veto. Under prevailing circumstances, to succeed a Republican-passed bill must threaten a Congressional over-ride. You must make this bill so unimpeachable as to guarantee pervasive bipartisan support. In the wake of base mass-shootings, and on the eve of the 2014 midterm elections, you have a bill that COULD achieve veto-proof support. It is your duty to shape the language of the bill to achieve that objective. It is not sufficient to fail-short by one vote in either chamber.
I trust that you will not take personal offense that I mention, in closing, the growing suspicion of the RINOs in Congress. It seems remarkable that Republicans sponsor so many - fundamentally sound - bills to the cheers of their conservative constituents. Nevertheless, most such bills attract too few Democrat supporters and just enough RINO defectors to fail passage. We now begin to wonder if there isn't a great conspiracy among the majority of the Republican caucus to seize failure from the jaws of victory. This bill offers an extraordinarily clear-cut case to prove that such suspicions are unwarranted.
Mark
I was very pleased to see that you have the common sense to sponsor HR 3199 - Safe Military Bases Act. I respectfully offer a suggested amendment to:
- preclude the Commander in Chief - whomsoever he may be - from frustrating Congressional will in respect of this bill; and,
- to remove plausible excuses for voting against the bill.
I further - respectfully - argue that IF the sponsors of this fine bill FAIL to AMEND its language they will CONDEM it to FAILURE in the face of plausible practical and Constitutional arguments from Democrat and weak-kneed opponents.
My suggestion is to alter the bill to REQUIRE the commander of each base to arm AT LEAST: 10% of the qualified personnel at each base by FYE 2015; 20% by 2016; . . . 50% by 2020.
The first weakness in the existing language is found in "military personnel shall NOT be PROHIBITED". Neither Maj. Hasan nor Specialist Lopez would have objected to the current bill's permissive language. Obviously, stripping or undermining officers' ability to regulate arms-bearing is counterproductive for our intended subjects; it ENABLES the very individuals we hope to arrest! This permissive aspect of the bill alone probably dooms its prospects. However laudable the objective of killing Hasan or Lopez before he claimed his 2'nd victim, many will refuse to authorize perpetrators from carrying on base. Notwithstanding that such refusal is a false-economy, it gives cover to a Nay vote.
Merely-permissive language will be rendered ineffective by a sufficiently determined President or officer in charge of a particular service branch. Military discipline is implemented - in the main - by a social understanding that service members acquiesce to the wishes of their superior officers. If the President - or any officer - merely wishes that his subordinates remain un-armed, the obedient will comply. Unfortunately, the existing language represents nothing more than a prayer that a few honorable, conscientious and responsible service members will DEFY the wishes of their immediate and senior officers by bearing concealed weapons. I will grant you that 1 - 10% of such service members will bear arms at some risk of retaliation; however, this will not be ENOUGH to achieve the goals of the act.
The act's language ("shall not reinstate the firearm bans") will not frustrate a determined President or officer. To illustrate, the DoD or any officer could simply allow any service member to carry - ONLY - a full-sized US 1911 .45 caliber handgun. Likely, only a few service members would both defy the tacit wishes of their superiors and desire to carry a relatively heavy - bulky - weapon that does not lend itself to concealment.
To be effective, the act's plan must result in some combination of two possibilities:
- open-carrying by a majority of those present in every venue; or,
- concealed-carry by a probable substantial minority in every venue.
Under a "full-sized US 1911" permissive rule, Hasan nor Specialist Lopez would simply seek-out a venue where, apparently, no more than one service member is (conspicuously) armed.
Our goal should be to arm, for illustration:
- 10 - 20% of open-carriers willing to bear the additional weight on their belts; and,
- 20 - 30% of concealed-carriers willing to bear at least a pocket-pistol.
Facing a 99% probability that any group of service members includes several arms-bearers ought to accomplish the objectives of the act.
Finally my proposed language avoids singling-out individual service-members. A base-commander ought to ban a service member such as Hasan or Lopez from bearing arms on base. Yet, political correctness or sensitivity would inhibit a commander from singling-out named service members under language where all are presumptively permitted even if commanders retained discretion to name the excluded. Leaving the commanding officer in charge of exactly which 10 - 50% are ordered to bear arms eliminates this problem. Major Hasan would simply have never been chosen to be ordered to bear arms. Specialist Lopez would "randomly" be rotated-off the list of servicemen ordered to be armed; without such an order, he would (under the current regime) be prohibited from bearing arms. Assuming a rich mix of concealed carriers, no one would be stigmatized by completing a career without ever being "honored" with the order to bear arms. Typically, non-coms would deliver periodic orders to arm/dis-arm each individual and would then enforce discipline by watching for individuals not so-ordered who might be carrying unauthorized concealed weapons.
Second, there is a political facet in the language of the existing bill that would be cured by my proposed alternative. The nay-sayers will argue - with some justification - that there is at least one serviceman in every company who seems to have a screw-loose. He represents a low-probability/high-consequence risk. (The services' personnel needs for non-combatants renders prohibitive screening-out all recruits and active-duty risks.) Any such serviceman should not be armed outside the scope of actual combat. (Neither Hasan nor Lopez would likely ever need to be armed for combat given their respective jobs.) Opponents can easily assert such an argument to justify their votes in opposition to a permissive bill.
My proposed language preserves discretion of the military to keep this minority un-armed while their superiors remain unconvinced of their reliability. The commander of each base would be COMPELLED to arm ONLY those individuals he and his junior officers are convinced represent the lowest risk of unjustified violence. This is to say that my proposal is entirely consistent with the existing regime of commander discretion as to WHOM to arm while baring the executive from creating a de-facto "nobility" of a tiny "court" of MPs.
I can also see a Constitutional argument; a part of the "political" prospects for the proposed act. While the President is Commander in Chief, Congress has authority "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces". These two authorities are in contention. Arguably, the President's authority might trump that of Congress were the latter to strip the executive of ALL authority to regulate carrying firearms on military bases. We, the Constitutionalists, must not be seen as insensitive to separation-of-powers.
My proposed language overcomes the foregoing objections. My language only compels commissioned officers to arm a MINORITY of qualified ARMED-service members on base. Such a - very measured - "Rule" could not be seen as seen as exceeding Congressional authority. The executive branch would retrain discretion to regulate arms-bearing by at least 1/2 of those nominally qualified. Nay-sayers could not reasonably argue that more than 1/2 of nominally-qualified service members are unreliable.
I fear that if the sponsors of this act fail to anticipate, and overcome, the objections I've explained above they will condemn it to defeat. Indeed, many of the sponsors' constituents could suspect that defeat-in-a-noble-cause was the intention from the outset. Obviously, a simple majority of both houses is insufficient to overcome a Presidential veto. Under prevailing circumstances, to succeed a Republican-passed bill must threaten a Congressional over-ride. You must make this bill so unimpeachable as to guarantee pervasive bipartisan support. In the wake of base mass-shootings, and on the eve of the 2014 midterm elections, you have a bill that COULD achieve veto-proof support. It is your duty to shape the language of the bill to achieve that objective. It is not sufficient to fail-short by one vote in either chamber.
I trust that you will not take personal offense that I mention, in closing, the growing suspicion of the RINOs in Congress. It seems remarkable that Republicans sponsor so many - fundamentally sound - bills to the cheers of their conservative constituents. Nevertheless, most such bills attract too few Democrat supporters and just enough RINO defectors to fail passage. We now begin to wonder if there isn't a great conspiracy among the majority of the Republican caucus to seize failure from the jaws of victory. This bill offers an extraordinarily clear-cut case to prove that such suspicions are unwarranted.
Mark
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