The Curley Effect
This is an educational as well as enjoyable read about what we see as a prevalent political behavior in California, New York, New Jersey, and a couple other states. It formalizes into theory what we already generally know by observation. Notice how it fits another favorite policy tool of theirs: can there be any doubt that this is the real motivation for the gun laws as well, as part of this type effort, driving gun owners out of the state to shape the vote? It's good now that we can put a formal label on it, the Curley Effect, and identify it as such.
Abstract
James Michael Curley, a four-time mayor of Boston, used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary rhetoric to encourage richer citizens to emigrate from Boston, thereby shaping the electorate in his favor. As a consequence, Boston stagnated, but Curley kept winning elections. We present a model of using redistributive politics to shape the electorate, and show that this model yields a number of predictions opposite from the more standard frameworks of political competition, yet consistent with empirical evidence.
James Michael Curley, a four-time mayor of Boston, used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary rhetoric to encourage richer citizens to emigrate from Boston, thereby shaping the electorate in his favor. As a consequence, Boston stagnated, but Curley kept winning elections. We present a model of using redistributive politics to shape the electorate, and show that this model yields a number of predictions opposite from the more standard frameworks of political competition, yet consistent with empirical evidence.
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