It would appear to me that any LE agency that denies a CCW is accepting responsibility and liability for that person's safety:
	
		
We know that the police are under no obligation to protect us per the above SCOTUS decision(the part in Red above).  However, the supremes left open (rather concisely) those conditions whereby the police ARE liable for our protection(bold & underlined above).
Now, if I apply to my local CLEO and my county sheriff for a CCW permit, and am subsequently denied a permit, under this decision, would those law enforcement agencies become instantly responsible for my personal security via this clause: "...from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf, through imprisonment, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty."? Heller & McDonald established that Keep, Bear, and Self-Defense as fundamental, individual, civil rights, i.e. Liberties. A CCW denial is a Liberty denial.
It looks to me like law enforcement agencies are opening themselves up to giant amounts of personal injury liability each time they deny a CCW. I could see a cottage industry developing for personal injury attorneys who pursue these types of cases. Imagine how many people would apply for a CCW just on the outside chance they got hurt down the line and could sue for damages in the millions.
					
			
			
			
				(a) A State's failure to protect an individual against private violence generally does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause, because the Clause imposes no duty on the State to provide members of the general public with adequate protective services. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security; while it forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, its language cannot fairly be read to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means. Pp. 194-197.
(b) There is no merit to petitioner's contention that the State's knowledge of his danger and expressions of willingness to protect him against that danger established a "special relationship" giving rise to an affirmative constitutional duty to protect. While certain "special relationships" created or assumed by the State with respect to particular individuals may give rise to an affirmative duty, enforceable through the Due Process [p190] Clause, to provide adequate protection, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97"]429 U.S. 97; 429 U.S. 97; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, the affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf, through imprisonment, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty. No such duty existed here, for the harms petitioner suffered did not occur while the State was holding him in its custody, but while he was in the custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state actor. While the State may have been aware of the dangers that he faced, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him more vulnerable to them. Under these circumstances, the Due Process Clause did not impose upon the State an affirmative duty to provide petitioner with adequate protection. Pp. 197-201.
(c) It may well be that, by voluntarily undertaking to provide petitioner with protection against a danger it played no part in creating, the State acquired a duty under state tort law to provide him with adequate protection against that danger. But the Due Process Clause does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation. Pp. 201-202.
812 F.2d. 298, affirmed.
	(b) There is no merit to petitioner's contention that the State's knowledge of his danger and expressions of willingness to protect him against that danger established a "special relationship" giving rise to an affirmative constitutional duty to protect. While certain "special relationships" created or assumed by the State with respect to particular individuals may give rise to an affirmative duty, enforceable through the Due Process [p190] Clause, to provide adequate protection, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97"]429 U.S. 97; 429 U.S. 97; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, the affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf, through imprisonment, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty. No such duty existed here, for the harms petitioner suffered did not occur while the State was holding him in its custody, but while he was in the custody of his natural father, who was in no sense a state actor. While the State may have been aware of the dangers that he faced, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him more vulnerable to them. Under these circumstances, the Due Process Clause did not impose upon the State an affirmative duty to provide petitioner with adequate protection. Pp. 197-201.
(c) It may well be that, by voluntarily undertaking to provide petitioner with protection against a danger it played no part in creating, the State acquired a duty under state tort law to provide him with adequate protection against that danger. But the Due Process Clause does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation. Pp. 201-202.
812 F.2d. 298, affirmed.
Now, if I apply to my local CLEO and my county sheriff for a CCW permit, and am subsequently denied a permit, under this decision, would those law enforcement agencies become instantly responsible for my personal security via this clause: "...from the limitations which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf, through imprisonment, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty."? Heller & McDonald established that Keep, Bear, and Self-Defense as fundamental, individual, civil rights, i.e. Liberties. A CCW denial is a Liberty denial.
It looks to me like law enforcement agencies are opening themselves up to giant amounts of personal injury liability each time they deny a CCW. I could see a cottage industry developing for personal injury attorneys who pursue these types of cases. Imagine how many people would apply for a CCW just on the outside chance they got hurt down the line and could sue for damages in the millions.

 
	 
	 
	
 
	 
	 
	

 
	
 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	 
	
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