New Case Law - Demurrer to California Charges Under NYSRPA

[RickD427]

Last year, Tony Diaz was charged with CCW in Sacramento County Superior Court.

He filed a demurrer to his charges on the basis that NYSRPA rendered California's CCW statute unconstitutional. He prevailed in the the trial court and his CCW charges were dismissed.

We have discussed his demurrer in several other threads, along with the caution that the trial court's action on the demurrer did not set any legal precedent and only applied to Mr. Diaz.

As of last week that has changed. The California Court of Appeals has published two decisions that pretty much explode the use of a trial court demurrer to CCW charges. Unlike the trial court decision in the Diaz case, these are published Appellate decisions that do establish legal precedent and that are binding on lower courts.

In the case of People v Miller, the case is essentially a "Carbon Copy" of the Diaz case. Ms. Miller was charged with CCW, like Mr. Diaz, she filed a demurrer to her criminal charges which the court granted. The Sacramento DA appealed the dismissal upon demurrer. The Court of Appeals overturned the dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of charges. The court's reasoning is hard to follow, but it basically provided that California's CCW statute is different from New York's statute and that NYSRPA did not not interpret California's statute. The Court also made an even more difficult to follow argument that even if California's CCW licensing statute were unconstitutional, that would not necessarily render California's CCW carrying statute as being unconstitutional.

The case of People v T.F.-G. is a little different. This was a juvenile case that resulted in a sustained petition for CCW. There were also several other criminal charges resulting from T.F.-G's conduct. I'm only addressing the CCW aspect in this posting.

Like Mr. Diaz from last year, and Ms. Miller above, T.G.-G also argued that California's CCW statute was constitutionally infirm under NYSRPA and therefore could not serve as the basis for his sustained petition.

The Court of Appeals took the position that the CCW statute would only be constitutionally infirm if there were "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." While T.F.-G did successfully argue that portions of the CCW statute were infirm, his showing did not rise to that level.

Please note that I'm not personally endorsing either decision. IMHO, both decisions really stretch credulity to reach their conclusions. But my personally opinion is quite irrelevant. These are not published decisions and are binding.

The bottom line is that if Mr. Diaz were file his demurrer in a trial court today, and if the trial court were to apply the binding legal precedent if these cases, that Mr. Diaz would see his demurrer denied.

[Dvrjon]

People v. Miller

…section 25400 does not violate the Second Amendment regardless of the constitutionality of California’s firearm licensing statutes.

People v. T.F.-G. Juvenile so initials only.

T.F.-G. contends that section 25850 is unconstitutional if any part of California’s Licensing scheme is unconstitutional, and the Attorney General concedes that section 26150 is unconstitutional under Bruen in so far as it restricts access to licenses by imposing a good cause requirement. Thus, T.F.-G. contends that section 25850 must also be unconstitutional. As we explain, T.F.-G.’s facial challenge falls short because the constitutional defect in California’s licensing scheme reaches only a narrower subset of the cases to which section 25850 applies.
[]
Although California’s “good cause” licensing requirement is undisputedly unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s 2022 “Bruen” decision, the unconstitutionality of a discrete licensing requirement does not render section 25850 facially unconstitutional.

[AlmostHeaven]

California state courts are in open rebellion against the Supreme Court of the United States. I am pessimistic about having the five necessary votes to instate nationwide constitutional carry, thereby removing the ability of further massive resistance on the issue, so I suppose everyone can do nothing except wait and see what happens.

[Fieldbredhandler]

Shouldn't this be moved to the litigation sub-forum, rather than the political sub-forum?

[Fieldbredhandler]

Note that in People v. Miller (3d Dist. 08/24/2023) Case No. C097229, the defendant, Miller, did not participate in the appeal, so the DCA was relying only upon the government's briefs and the trial court record.

[rplaw]

Theoretically you could argue that the failure of the State legislature to amend the statute after Bruen indicates that the legislature believes that the licensing provisions are unconstitutional in toto. Otherwise they would have amended the law in the year since Bruen. As it stands, the statute reflects an unlawful set of criteria which cannot be enforced. Further, after striking the unenforceable sections, the remainder is nothing more than a revenue scheme designed to curtail Constitutional Rights.

It's an argument. Whether it would fly is debatable, but it is an argument.

[BAJ475]

Last year, Tony Diaz was charged with CCW in Sacramento County Superior Court.

He filed a demurrer to his charges on the basis that NYSRPA rendered California's CCW statute unconstitutional. He prevailed in the the trial court and his CCW charges were dismissed.

We have discussed his demurrer in several other threads, along with the caution that the trial court's action on the demurrer did not set any legal precedent and only applied to Mr. Diaz.

As of last week that has changed. The California Court of Appeals has published two decisions that pretty much explode the use of a trial court demurrer to CCW charges. Unlike the trial court decision in the Diaz case, these are published Appellate decisions that do establish legal precedent and that are binding on lower courts.

In the case of People v Miller, the case is essentially a "Carbon Copy" of the Diaz case. Ms. Miller was charged with CCW, like Mr. Diaz, she filed a demurrer to her criminal charges which the court granted. The Sacramento DA appealed the dismissal upon demurrer. The Court of Appeals overturned the dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of charges. The court's reasoning is hard to follow, but it basically provided that California's CCW statute is different from New York's statute and that NYSRPA did not not interpret California's statute. The Court also made an even more difficult to follow argument that even if California's CCW licensing statute were unconstitutional, that would not necessarily render California's CCW carrying statute as being unconstitutional.

The case of People v T.F.-G. is a little different. This was a juvenile case that resulted in a sustained petition for CCW. There were also several other criminal charges resulting from T.F.-G's conduct. I'm only addressing the CCW aspect in this posting.

Like Mr. Diaz from last year, and Ms. Miller above, T.G.-G also argued that California's CCW statute was constitutionally infirm under NYSRPA and therefore could not serve as the basis for his sustained petition.

The Court of Appeals took the position that the CCW statute would only be constitutionally infirm if there were "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." While T.F.-G did successfully argue that portions of the CCW statute were infirm, his showing did not rise to that level.

Please note that I'm not personally endorsing either decision. IMHO, both decisions really stretch credulity to reach their conclusions. But my personally opinion is quite irrelevant. These are not published decisions and are binding.

The bottom line is that if Mr. Diaz were file his demurrer in a trial court today, and if the trial court were to apply the binding legal precedent if these cases, that Mr. Diaz would see his demurrer denied.

Rick, while I have not yet read the appellate court opinions I see another technical issue. A demurrer is limited to the face of the complaint with the assumption that all properly plead facts are true. So if it is alleged that the defendant carried a firearm without having the required license, that would be sufficient. Whether or not CA permitting requirements are unconstitutional, is outside the face of the complaint. The place to raise such issues would not be in a demurrer but at the preliminary hearing where evidence could be presented.

[RickD427]

Rick, while I have not yet read the appellate court opinions I see another technical issue. A demurrer is limited to the face of the complaint with the assumption that all properly plead facts are true. So if it is alleged that the defendant carried a firearm without having the required license, that would be sufficient. Whether or not CA permitting requirements are unconstitutional, is outside the face of the complaint. The place to raise such issues would not be in a demurrer but at the preliminary hearing where evidence could be presented.

I'm curious as to how you would analyze the two cases. The Miller case is notable for its close parallel to the Diaz case, but to a different outcome.

There was no demurrer in the T.F.-G case. His attorney went straight to the issues in the case in the manner you suggest.

[ohsmily]

Rick, while I have not yet read the appellate court opinions I see another technical issue. A demurrer is limited to the face of the complaint with the assumption that all properly plead facts are true. So if it is alleged that the defendant carried a firearm without having the required license, that would be sufficient. Whether or not CA permitting requirements are unconstitutional, is outside the face of the complaint. The place to raise such issues would not be in a demurrer but at the preliminary hearing where evidence could be presented.

The complaint doesn't allege carrying a firearm without a permit. It pleads the language of 25400 (and 25850 if it is loaded) there is no mention of a permit in either statute. You need to turn to the CCW statutes to find the exemptions from 25400, etc. There is no need for the DA to plead that "no applicable exemptions apply".

I got a client a full dismissal about 60 days ago on a demurrer in Sac (D61)...slid into home before the change. **** all these tyrants in robes in the appellate courts.)

Also, the past tense of "plead" is "pled"; like lead and led.