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A news article from WCPO Channel 9 in Kentucky points to the changing tactics for dealing with an active shooter situation.
For those who don't like links, here's the executive summary.
First - the important points were made about mass murders in the U.S.
In the last 40 years, researchers have compiled the profile of the typical mass murderer, the type that walk into schools, post offices or their employer's offices to kill multiple people.
Called "active shooters" or "active killers" because they are actively killing their victims when police are called and/or arrive on the scene, they are the source of major headlines nationwide.
According to the profile, these mass murderers seek to inflict as many casualties as quickly as possible and don't necessarily seek evade or escape capture. The profile also indicates most active killers have no intention of surviving the event. They select "soft targets" like shopping malls and schools precisely because they contain large numbers of defenseless victims with the virtual guarantee no on the scene one is armed.
And typically, as soon as they're confronted by any armed resistance, the shooters turn the gun on themselves.
History of Response:
Until 1999, tactics dictated first responders contain the incident and perpetrator until a tactical SWAT team arrived to take over.
With the Columbine High School shootings, police realized that they did not have time to wait for tactical support. Instead, the doctrine changed to employ the first four or five arriving officers as an ad-hoc tactical team. They would enter the site in a diamond formation, guns pointed in different directions and seek and engage the shooter.
Then, in April 2007, a lone gunman at Virginia Tech killed 32 people in the university's Norris Hall in just 11 minutes. That more than three people were killed and a total of four were shot every minute. As predicted, the gunman continued shooting until a four-officer team made entry and then he killed himself.
Since Virginia Tech, experts have determined the first officer on the scene should make entry immediately, with an aggressive attack on the shooter. In these incidents, time is of the essence. For every minute the officer waits for back-up, another three or more people could die.
“Time is our worst adversary in dealing with active killers,” says Borsch. “We’re racing what I call ‘the Stopwatch of Death.’ Victims are often added to the toll every several seconds.”
In other words, while it was once considered suicide for a lone officer to take on an active killer, it is now considered statistical homicide for him not to do so.
The other statistic that emerged is that "active shooters" almost exclusively seek out "gun free" zones for their attacks. Most states prohibit the carrying of concealed firearms in schools and college campuses, even with a CCW permit. Many malls and workplaces also prohibit firearms by placing signs at their entrances.
Now some tacticians believe the signs themselves may be an invitation to the active killers.
WCPO received many questions about the killings taking place in gun-free zones, so they did their own analysis of mass murders in the U.S. What were their findings about these mass killings?
“Officers need to understand valid military principles that apply to these calls, such as speed, surprise and violence of action,” SEALE Academy's Borsch insists. “They need to learn how to close in and finish the fight with aggression, having and keeping the ‘momentum of battle’ on their side. The idea is to keep the adversary off-balance by forcing him always to react to your actions, rather than, after contact, reacting to him.”
For example, once an active killer is spotted, Borsch favors the swift application of deadly force over seeking defensive cover in most instances. “An unintentional consequence of going to cover may be to lose sight of the offender, allowing him to gain the momentum of battle and shoot more defenseless innocents until he says it’s over.”
Borsch, is a 17 year police veteran and a part-time SWAT team member before retiring from street work, analyzed more than 90 active-shooter incidents on the basis of data largely ferreted out from Internet reports. Most involved schools and colleges, but workplaces, shopping malls, churches and other public places are also represented.
Among his findings that have helped shape his tactical thinking:
Comments?
For those who don't like links, here's the executive summary.
First - the important points were made about mass murders in the U.S.
- Most mass murders perform their killings in "gun free" zones.
- A fast, armed response is the best way to deal with mass murderers.
- The first officer on the scene should use speed, surprise and violence of action to end the incident quickly.
- Most mass killers, when confronted with armed resistance turn their guns on themselves.
- The majority of active shooters are actually poor shots, averaging less than a 50% hit rate.
In the last 40 years, researchers have compiled the profile of the typical mass murderer, the type that walk into schools, post offices or their employer's offices to kill multiple people.
Called "active shooters" or "active killers" because they are actively killing their victims when police are called and/or arrive on the scene, they are the source of major headlines nationwide.
According to the profile, these mass murderers seek to inflict as many casualties as quickly as possible and don't necessarily seek evade or escape capture. The profile also indicates most active killers have no intention of surviving the event. They select "soft targets" like shopping malls and schools precisely because they contain large numbers of defenseless victims with the virtual guarantee no on the scene one is armed.
And typically, as soon as they're confronted by any armed resistance, the shooters turn the gun on themselves.
History of Response:
Until 1999, tactics dictated first responders contain the incident and perpetrator until a tactical SWAT team arrived to take over.
With the Columbine High School shootings, police realized that they did not have time to wait for tactical support. Instead, the doctrine changed to employ the first four or five arriving officers as an ad-hoc tactical team. They would enter the site in a diamond formation, guns pointed in different directions and seek and engage the shooter.
Then, in April 2007, a lone gunman at Virginia Tech killed 32 people in the university's Norris Hall in just 11 minutes. That more than three people were killed and a total of four were shot every minute. As predicted, the gunman continued shooting until a four-officer team made entry and then he killed himself.
Since Virginia Tech, experts have determined the first officer on the scene should make entry immediately, with an aggressive attack on the shooter. In these incidents, time is of the essence. For every minute the officer waits for back-up, another three or more people could die.
“Time is our worst adversary in dealing with active killers,” says Borsch. “We’re racing what I call ‘the Stopwatch of Death.’ Victims are often added to the toll every several seconds.”
In other words, while it was once considered suicide for a lone officer to take on an active killer, it is now considered statistical homicide for him not to do so.
The other statistic that emerged is that "active shooters" almost exclusively seek out "gun free" zones for their attacks. Most states prohibit the carrying of concealed firearms in schools and college campuses, even with a CCW permit. Many malls and workplaces also prohibit firearms by placing signs at their entrances.
Now some tacticians believe the signs themselves may be an invitation to the active killers.
WCPO received many questions about the killings taking place in gun-free zones, so they did their own analysis of mass murders in the U.S. What were their findings about these mass killings?
- The vast majority occurred in schools or on college campuses where firearms are banned as a matter of state statutes.
- Others took place in post offices where firearms are banned as a matter of federal law.
- Most of the rest took place in shopping malls or other businesses where the owners posted signs prohibiting firearm possession by anyone including those with CCW permits.
“Officers need to understand valid military principles that apply to these calls, such as speed, surprise and violence of action,” SEALE Academy's Borsch insists. “They need to learn how to close in and finish the fight with aggression, having and keeping the ‘momentum of battle’ on their side. The idea is to keep the adversary off-balance by forcing him always to react to your actions, rather than, after contact, reacting to him.”
For example, once an active killer is spotted, Borsch favors the swift application of deadly force over seeking defensive cover in most instances. “An unintentional consequence of going to cover may be to lose sight of the offender, allowing him to gain the momentum of battle and shoot more defenseless innocents until he says it’s over.”
Borsch, is a 17 year police veteran and a part-time SWAT team member before retiring from street work, analyzed more than 90 active-shooter incidents on the basis of data largely ferreted out from Internet reports. Most involved schools and colleges, but workplaces, shopping malls, churches and other public places are also represented.
Among his findings that have helped shape his tactical thinking:
- 98% of active killers act alone.
- 80% have long guns, 75% have multiple weapons (about 3 per incident), and they sometimes bring hundreds of extra rounds of ammunition to the shooting site.
- Despite such heavy armaments and an obsession with murder at close range, they have an average hit rate of less than 50%.
- They strike “stunned, defenseless innocents via surprise ambush. On a level playing field, the typical active killer would be a no-contest against anyone reasonably capable of defending themselves.”
- “They absolutely control life and death until they stop at their leisure or are stopped.” They do not take hostages, do not negotiate.
- They generally try to avoid police, do not hide or lie in wait for officers and “typically fold quickly upon armed confrontation.”
- 90% commit suicide on-site. “Surrender or escape attempts are unlikely.”
Comments?
Can't wait until we see more widespread use of CCWs by upright citizens who won't take justice into their own hands but will stop the carnage should a situation break out.
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